TokenTrace

Polygon Hard-Fork Proposal Would Reassign 70.49 Million Frozen POL

As reported on November 5, 2026, at 21:00 Beijing time, Polymarket and Binance had proposed a Polygon PoS hard fork to recover approximately 70.49 million POL from five addresses identified as attacker-controlled. The proposal called for those balances to be cleared and an equal amount credited to recovery addresses designated by the two companies. It had not been adopted at the time of reporting; the teams were scheduled to present it at a Polygon Protocol Governance Call at 22:30 Beijing time that day.

The proposal followed two security incidents on October 30: a compromise of Polymarket’s front end and a compromise of a Binance hot wallet. According to the report, Polygon validators froze four addresses associated with the Polymarket incident, holding 23.86 million POL, and one associated with the Binance incident, holding 46.63 million POL. The report gave two approximate dollar values for the combined amount—$6.7 million and $6.5 million—without explaining the difference.

What the fork would change

The existing freezes prevented transfers from the identified addresses. The proposed fork would go further: it would change account balances through a network-level state adjustment, without signatures from the keys controlling those addresses. Crediting the recovery addresses with the same amount removed would leave the total POL supply unchanged, but it would change who controlled the tokens.

Polymarket had sought the attacker’s cooperation without receiving a response, the report said. The proposal also alleged that the attacker contacted Polygon validators and offered cash in exchange for unfreezing an address. That allegation is attributed to the proposal, not established independently here. Polymarket and Binance said the proposed adjustment would apply only to addresses involved in these two incidents and should not establish a general recovery mechanism.

The governance question

The distinction is between restricting an address’s ability to transact and rewriting its balance. The latter would require Polygon participants to accept a specific exception to ordinary key-based control of funds. As of the November 5 report, Polygon, relevant governance-call members and core developers had not publicly stated positions on the proposal. Its outcome therefore remained uncertain.

There are precedents for intervention by hard fork, though their circumstances differ. After the 2016 exploitation of The DAO, Ethereum adopted a fork that moved funds to a refund contract; opponents continued the original chain as Ethereum Classic. More recently, following an October 31, 2026 incident involving roughly 97 million CORE staked through b14g, Core Network announced a November 2 fork to recover 68,146,177.22 CORE from three attacker-controlled addresses—about 70.2% of the CORE affected, according to the report.

The report said Polymarket and Binance had already fully reimbursed affected users and estimated the proposed 70.49 million POL adjustment at less than 1% of circulating supply. Those circumstances make this proposal a question about the acceptable scope of Polygon governance, not an established necessity for compensating users. Whether the network would accept that trade-off was unresolved at the original reporting time.