TokenTrace

PACTs and the Quantum Sunset Problem: Can a Timestamp Preserve the Right to Spend?

Original reporting: May 1, 2026, 22:54 UTC+8. This article examines a proposal, not an adopted Bitcoin rule.

If a sufficiently powerful quantum computer could derive private keys from exposed Bitcoin public keys, holders of affected coins would face a choice: move their funds before an attack becomes possible or risk theft. A proposed alternative is to sunset spending from those outputs through a future soft fork. That would protect against quantum-derived keys, but it could also freeze coins whose holders did not move them in time.

A Paradigm proposal asks whether holders could establish evidence of control before a quantum attacker could derive their keys, without publicly moving their coins now. It calls that evidence a Provable Address-Control Timestamp, or PACT.

The dormant-holder problem

The proposal says hundreds of billions of dollars in Bitcoin may be held at addresses with exposed public keys. It estimates that wallets believed to belong to Satoshi Nakamoto hold around 1.1 million BTC, worth over $75 billion at the time of the original report. Both the wallet attribution and valuation are the source’s estimates, not findings established by this article.

A sunset, such as the one contemplated in the draft of BIP-361, would require affected holders to act before a deadline or lose the ordinary ability to spend. Moving coins would incur fees and create a public on-chain record that could reveal activity and links between wallets. The source also describes potential rescue proofs for some keys derived under BIP-32, but notes that this route would not cover earlier keys that predate that standard.

How the proposed timestamp works

In the article’s illustrative design—not a formal specification—a holder generates a random 256-bit salt and uses BIP-322 full message signing to prove control of the vulnerable output’s scriptPubKey. The signed message identifies the PACT purpose, Bitcoin network, output script and salt. The holder hashes the proof with the salt to make a commitment, then timestamps that commitment through OpenTimestamps, which can anchor batched hashes to Bitcoin.

The holder keeps the salt, control proof and OpenTimestamps proof file privately. Creating the commitment requires no transaction by the holder; the published timestamp does not disclose the address, public key or control proof. Interaction with a timestamping service could still expose network metadata.

If Bitcoin later adopted both a sunset and a PACT rescue path, a claimant could submit a post-quantum-secure zero-knowledge proof, such as a STARK. Under the proposed rules, it would need to establish that the commitment was anchored in Bitcoin before a cutoff set ahead of the presumed quantum threat, that the hidden BIP-322 proof controlled the affected output, and that the rescue authorization applied to the specific spending transaction. Verification would also need to connect the OpenTimestamps attestation to a Bitcoin transaction and a block recognized as part of the active chain before the cutoff.

What remains unresolved

A timestamp would not itself grant a future right to spend. Bitcoin has adopted neither a quantum sunset nor this rescue mechanism. The source says adding STARK verification to Bitcoin would require substantial protocol work; it also flags unresolved standardization for multisig, complex scripts, custodial wallets and hardware wallets. A valid message-signing proof may not always establish the ability to spend from an address.

PACTs therefore offer a proposed way to preserve evidence of earlier key control, not an implemented quantum defense or a guarantee of recovery. Whether that evidence would ever be accepted depends on future protocol decisions—and a sufficiently early, verifiable cutoff.